Thursday, October 30, 2014

Why Inferential Statistics - Part 1

I am preparing a handout for undergrad research methods students (in several departments), who are about to get 1-class-session tutorials in SPSS. I have 3 pages to give them enough information to understand what we are doing. Here is page 1:



Why Inferential Statistics?

Imagine we had a question: “Do men and women differ on X?”
No matter what “X” is—height, empathy, knowledge of 13th century Spanish history, or anything else—we know that any given man will be different than any given woman, but what we don’t know is how men “on average” differ from women “on average.” That is, when we asked our initial question, we probably wanted to know how the mean for men compared with the mean for women. But we will never know the actual mean for men or the actual mean for women, because that would involve measuring more than 7 billion people! So, we need to, somehow, get a sample of men and a sample of women, compare them, and draw a conclusion from that.

Why academic writing sucks - Part II

Before I start my academic writing challenge, I wanted to finish up a few things, including one more reaction from Pinker's paper on "Why Academic Writing Stinks". I keep coming back to one accusation Pinker makes about academic writing, one that struck particularly close to home: The idea that academic writing is flawed by virtue of being self-reflexive and by making its assumptions and their justifications clear. For example, apparently he would hate the fact that the book I am preparing on evolution and psychology considers whether we can sensibly talk about the evolution of psychological processes. My knee jerk reaction is "Of course I need to talk about that, the answer isn't obvious at all!" But then Pinker shows how undermining that type of writing can be, with a convincing (borrowed) example of a self-reflexive cookbook:

Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Academic NaNoWriMo Challenge!

I am issuing a challenge to all my colleagues! For those who do not know, November is National Novel Writing Month (pronounced: NaNoWriMo). This is a great event that challenges participants to write at least 50,000 words in a month. (Over 400,000 people participated last year, including 90,000 K-12 students doing the youth challenge.) I do kind of want to write a novel... but I do feel the need to get my academic productivity kicked up a notch, and this is a good excuse. Trying this worked well for me last year, and I want to challenge others to join me this year. Keep reading for details.

Friday, October 3, 2014

Why Academic Writing Sucks

I'm not a huge fan of Stephen Pinker's psychology, but he is a solid writer, and I respect his perspective on many subjects. So when he wrote a Chronicle article on "Why Academics Stink at Writing" I took notice. The article starts by considering, and rejecting several suggestions for why academic writing is so bad:
  • Bad writing is there deliberately, to stop normal people from realizing scholars are talking about nothing.
  • Bad writing cannot be avoided, because the topics of discussion are so complex.
  • Bad writing is virtually required by reviewers and editors, who will not accept papers written in more straightforward manners.
These things happen, but apply to a very small percentage of published work, Pinker claims. Instead, Pinker suggests that academic writing is bad because it tries to mix writing styles, and authors become muddled about the audience and its desires. As he puts it:
Most academic writing, in contrast, is a blend of two styles. The first is practical style, in which the writer’s goal is to satisfy a reader’s need for a particular kind of information, and the form of the communication falls into a fixed template, such as the five-paragraph student essay or the standardized structure of a scientific article. The second is a style that Thomas and Turner call self-conscious, relativistic, ironic, or postmodern, in which "the writer’s chief, if unstated, concern is to escape being convicted of philosophical naïveté about his own enterprise."
With this perspective in mind, Pinker argues that much bad writing in academia is the result of "agonizing self-consciousness". This leads to too much meta-discussion, and leads academics to lose the balance between their role as communicators of knowledge vs. their role as members of a profession with its own internal norms and mores. There are many good criticisms of common phrases used by academics, which weaken their writing, and bad habits, such as the misuse of scare quotes. He goes on to talk about how certain cognitive processes (chunking, functional fixity, and the curse of knowledge) make it hard for authors to realize what will make sense to their readers. And he ends with a discussion about how few obvious incentives there are for academics to write well. For the most part I nodded in agreement, and thought about making some minor tweaks to a few papers that are in the pipeline. However, there were two points that made me uneasy.

First, Pinker criticizes "apologizing", such as when authors say that the topics they are about to write on are "extremely complex." I can see how this can be inappropriate in some circumstances, but I think the audience needs to be considered. Many of the things I write about are not subjects that others think about much, and when others do think about those subjects, they tend to think things are very simple. In that context, when I use the language Pinker is criticizing, it is because I am informing the reader that their initial views might be mistaken. For example, the types of psychological questions you can ask using a rat, in a box with a level and a few lights, are quite complex. Many psychology students and even many psychology professors (nevertheless members of the general public) do not believe that assertion, until they have learned quite a bit about the amazing studies that people have done.

Second, Pinker criticizes authors who "hedge" their statements, rather than relying on the reader to be charitable. This criticism baffled me. Certainly it is possible to over-hedge, but Pinker lives in a world full of non-charitable readers. I cannot understand his position except as a weird statement of elitism: He is too influential to be taken down by minor nit-picking, so he assumes all academics have the luxury of ignoring it as well. In my world, there is a big difference between making a claim such as "Perception is accurate" and saying "For the most part, perception is accurate." Depending on the context, a paper could easily get rejected for the hedged sentence, or get rejected for the non-hedged sentence. --- In fairness, Pinker acknowledges that some hedging may be necessary, but argues that skilled writers use it cautiously, rather than as a "tick." Alas, I'm not sure that hedge is sufficient to convey the reality; most academic authors face extremely ungenerous gatekeepers.
It is also interesting to note how often Pinker cannot resist the urge to be clever, inserting semi-jokes, at the expense of clarity. I do that too, but I am not sure I would do it so much in a piece specifically about clear writing. It makes his article half-way between something amazingly clear, like Elements of Style, and joking self-aware rule lists, with entries such as "Preposition are not things to end a sentence with."

Overall, however, very good, and recommended reading.

Monday, September 29, 2014

The once and future behaviorism - Ralph Barton Perry

Perry was a Harvard Philosophy Prof, a major student of William James, and James's first biographer. There are excerpts from his 1921 paper "A Behaviorist View of Purpose." These notes are part of a continuing effort to reconstruct a better history of behaviorism... or, perhaps, a history of the better behaviorism that never quite happened.

The article is good, overall, but it has some problems. These are mostly in its leaning towards stimulus-response formulations and not properly contextualizing the place of neuroscience insights. Perry shouldnt' make these mistakes, given his familiarity with Dewey (e.g., the "Reflex Arc" paper) and Holt (e.g., the "Recessions of the Stimulus" concept), but que sera. I'm only quoting some choice sections below, so those shortcomings won't be apparent. The article gives some insight into the connection between James's work and the rapid acceptance of behaviorism, and is relevant to some emerging movements today.

The difference between psychology and physiology ceases to be a difference of subject-matter, like the difference between entomology and ornithology, where each deals exhaustively and exclusively with a class of objects; and becomes a difference of method and approach like that between chemistry and physics, where two sciences deal with interpenetrating type-complexes which contain common elements and are found in the same objects. Psychology deals with the grosser facts of organic behavior, and particularly with those external and internal adjustments by which the organism acts as a unit, while physiology deals with the more elementary constituent processes, such as metabolism or the nervous impulse. But in so far as psychology divides the organism it approaches physiology, and in so far as physiology integrates the organism it approaches psychology. (p. 85)

Now many will object that this is to leave out "consciousness." But what is this "consciousness" we are under obligation to include---is it a datum or a theory? It was once said that psychology omitted the soul. And so it did, in so far as the term "soul" was the name for a theory formulated in theology or "rational" psychology. But psychology never deliberately neglected any of the facts or problems lying within the field of the mental life of man; and as a result of omitting the older theory of the soul it reached a very much better understanding of the actual mode of existence in question. No one would now think of conceiving the soul as a simple, indivisible and incorruptible static entity, or as a naked act of pure reason. In every [current] philosophy the soul is now a process; or a flowing, and more or less complexly organized, experience. When, therefore, we say the soul is lost, what we really mean is that a theory is more or less obsolete, as a result of its having been successfully ignored. The soul as an existent fact having a nature and an explanation, is not lost, but found.

Now something of this same outcome may with reasonable safety be predicted in the case of  "consciousness." If a behaviorist be enlightened he will have no intention of omitting any facts, but only of abandoning a theory which he believes has proved unsatisfactory. He does not abandon consciousness, but the introspective theory of consciousness. This consists in taking the data of introspective analysis as the ultimate constituents of the mental life, the units which in their own peculiar aggregations and sequences compose mind. Psychophysical parallelism and atomic sensationalism are developments of this theory, and are evidences of its weakness. It has in fact never worked. The most illuminating things that psychology has said have been said when it has allowed itself liberties with this theory, and introduced as much of the outlying physical and organic field as proved convenient. The behaviorist has emphasized the failure of the introspective theory to yield results comparable to those obtained in kindred sciences, and proposes to try another. He does not deny or intend to neglect any of the data of introspection. He merely believes that this is not the best place to begin, because the introspecting mind is a peculiarly complex form of the mental life. He regards an animal reflex or habit as a more elementary mental phenomenon than an introspectively discriminated sensory intensity.... The behaviorist concedes that introspection and all its works must find a place in any comprehensive and adequate view of mind. When they do find their place they will perhaps have lost their present outlines, because of having been broken up and redistributed. But in so far as the new theory is more successful than the old, consciousness as a group of facts, as something that exists and happens, will have been found and not lost. (ibid, p.87-88)

Sunday, June 22, 2014

Digital Humanities and Darwin on Psychology... Notes from the field: Cheiron, Day 3

The morning of Cheiron, Day 3 contained a fascinating panel using "Digital Humanities" methods to study the history of psychology. And some interesting coverage of evolutionary and epigenetic topics. Digital Humanities methods were first. These methods do complex textual analysis, and have great potential to provide insights into changes in psychology's history that are simply too dispersed across texts to be observed in any other way.  I suspect that, when better developed, these methods will also find niches in non-historical empirical work in our field.

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Notes from the Field: Cheiron 2014, Day 1

I have the great pleasure of being within driving distance of Cheiron this year. It is a small and very supportive conference focused on the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences. "Psychology" certainly gets the plurality of talks, but many other disciplines are represented. Today was only a half day, but here are some of the highlights.